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III.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
Box Elder County's arguments against proceedings with Ombdudman's Office are based
on obvious misunderstandings of the Ombudsman's Act and the mission of the Ombudsman's
Office. These misunderstandings lead Box Elder County to wrongly assume that the Property
Ombudman's Office is attempting to "wrest" jurisdiction of this matter away from the district
court. These misunderstandings have also lead Box Elder County to make unfounded
accusations of bias against the Ombudsman's Office. In the end, Box Elder County's unjustified
fears do not justify the actions of the courts below in denying the Selmans and other property
owners their statutory right to pursue arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office as a means of
alternative dispute resolution of takings and eminent domain matters.
A.

Box Elder County1 s arguments against proceedings with the Ombudsman's

Office are based on misunderstandings regarding the purpose of the Ombudsman's Act.
Box Elder County's brief illustrates the County's fundamental misunderstanding of the
Ombudsman's Act. In its initial analysis of the Ombudsman's Act, Box Elder County focuses
closely on the word "award" as used throughout § 13-42-204 of the Act.1 After examining the
use of the term "award" in the statute, Box Elder County concludes that the only purpose for
arbitration under the Act is:
[T]o help arbitrate a monetary damage award between a private
property owner and the government to compensate the property

1

Brief ofAppellee Box Elder County, p. 12.
1

owner for property taken by eminent domain.2
In asserting this argument, Box Elder County clearly misconstrues the meaning of the term
"award' in the context of arbitration.
Admittedly, the term "award" in common parlance often refers to someone being given
something of value. However, "award" has a specific meaning in the context of arbitration and
within the Ombudsman's Act. As explained in Black's Law Dictionary, an "award" is:
The decision or determination rendered by arbitrators or
commissioner, or other private or extrajudicial deciders, upon a
controversy submitted to them; also the writing or document
embodying such decision.3
Case law also defines an "award" in an arbitration context as the judgment or decision of an
arbitrator.4 Rather than simply delivering money to property owners, an "award" under the Act is
the written decision and determination of the arbitrator. In short, the use of the word "award"
does not preclude a decision in favor of a government entity.
The fact that the statute contemplates that an arbitrator from an Ombudsman's: Office
arbitration will "determine the award" does not mean that property owners win every dispute
referred to the Office. The fact that a Ombudsman's Office arbitrator is required to "issue a final
award" does not mean that the property owner will necessarily be receiving a monetary damage
award. The fact that a party may "submit the award" to a de novo review does not presume that
the award will consist of compensation by a government entity to a private property owner.

2

Brief ofAppellee Box Elder County, p. 13.

^Black's Law Dictionary 137 (6th ed., West 1990).
4

Keiser v. Berks County, 253 Pa. 167, 168, 97 A. 1067 (Pa. 1916),
2

Rather, as in any arbitration, the "award" may consist of a decision against either party.
Box Elder County's misunderstanding of the term "award" in the context of the
Ombudsman's Act taints its analysis in this case, and perhaps provides some explanation for the
County's unjustified accusations against the Ombudsman's Office.
B.

Upholding arbitration with Ombudsman's Office does not "wrest"

jurisdiction from the District Court.
In its brief, Box Elder County repeatedly characterizes the Ombudsman's Office's
involvement in this matter as a ploy to "wrest" jurisdiction away from the district court.5 In
imagining this supposed jurisdictional battle, Box Elder County asks this Court to assume that it
is presented with an "either-or" choice between proceeding with litigation at the district court or
moving forward with resolution efforts through the Ombudsman's Office. In fact, when
examined more closely, the picture painted by Box Elder County is a false dichotomy.
Nothing in the Ombudsman's Act requires a district court to stay mediation or arbitration
before the Ombudsman's Office in order to maintain control of litigation. Likewise, nothing in
the phrase "as if the matter were ordered to mediation or arbitration by a court"6 implies that
arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office requires oversight by the district court. To the contrary,
"a private arbitrator's award is outside the judicial system."7
Instead of the false dichotomy presented by Box Elder County, the Ombudsman's Act

5

See e.g. Brief of Appellee Box Elder County, pp. 11, 13,14,16,17, and 19.

6

7

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(2).
Vandenbergv.

Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 242-43, 21 Cal. 4th 815 (Cal.

1999).
3

allows for a several legitimate scenarios:
1.

The parties may litigate and not request arbitration, or

2.

The parties may arbitrate and not commence litigation, or

3.

The parties may arbitrate and litigate simultaneously.8

Other statutory provisions related to the Ombudsman's Act clearly illustrate that the Legislature
contemplated that dispute resolution activities with the Ombudsman's Office may proceed
simultaneously with litigation at the district court.9
In the end, dispute resolutions efforts with the Ombudsman's Office, do not uwrest"
jurisdiction from the district court. Rather, the district court retains jurisdiction to m aintain and
manage pending litigation independent of the activities of the Ombudsman's Office. As such,
there is no reason to conclude that proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office will undermine or
interfere with the ability of a district court to control litigation before it,
C.

The Ombudsman's Office has exhibited no bias against Box Elder County.

In several instances Box Elder County has unfairly accused the Ombudsman's; Office of
bias in favor of the Selmans and against Box Elder County.10 In reality, the Ombudsman's Office
is governed by clear statutory guidelines which prevent any such biasfromcoming into play.
As required by statute, the Ombudsman's Office is governed by the Land Use and
Eminent Domain Advisory Board ("the Board"). As a government entity, Box Elder County is

8

U.C.A. § 13-42-204(3)(f).

9

See e.g. U.C.A. § 78B-6-522(3)(a) and (b) which grants arbitrator from
Ombudsman's Office authority to move court for stay of pending litigation.
10

See e.g., Brief of Appellee Box Elder County, pp. 14-17.
4

well-represented on the Board. One of the seven board members represents municipal
governments. A second board member is nominated by the Utah Association of Counties and
represents county governments. By contrast, the Ombudsman's Act contains no specific
provision for explicit representation of ranchers or farmers. It is this Board, not some rogue
government administrator, which establishes rules of conduct and performance for the
Ombudsman's Office.11 It is simply inconceivable that a board with this type of representation
would display such a bias against Box Elder County.
In any event, the Ombudsman's Office was not going to arbitrate or issue the arbitration
award in this matter. The Office had already determined to retain the services of an arbitrator to
attempt to resolve this dispute.
Specifically as it relates to choosing an arbitrator to hear a dispute, it is not a random
worker at the Ombudsman's Office which selects an arbitrator. Rather, it is the Board which
maintains a "resource list" of arbitrators to hear disputes.12 As noted in the Selmans' opening
brief, in this particular instance, the Ombudsman's Office designated retired Utah Supreme Court
Justice Michael Zimmerman as the arbitrator.13 It seems a far stretch for Box Elder County to
claim that Mr. Zimmerman or any of the other qualified individuals on the Board's resource list
are unfairly biased against the County. Nevertheless, if Box Elder County did have legitimate
concerns regarding the arbitrator, the Ombudsman's Act provides that the arbitrator must be

"See generally U.C.A. § 13-42-202(1) and (8)(b).
n

SeeU.CA.

§13-42-202(9).

13

Appellants Opening Brief '(Supreme Court) Addendum D-2.
5

agreeable to both parties, or, in the alternative, that a arbitration panel may be appointed.14
Finally, regardless of who is chosen, that arbitrator is required by statute to apply the
relevant statutes, case law, regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the
arbitration and in determining the award."15
The Ombudsman's Office's record of success stands as a further refutation of Box Elder
County's allegations of bias. In the first decade of its existence, the Ombudsman's Office has
been involved in thousands of disputes regarding eminent domain, takings, and land use.16 Staff
attorneys at the Ombudsman's Office are engaged daily in the dispute resolution process. For
purpose of perspective, from April to December 2007, the Ombudsman's Office staff handled
between one thousand and two thousand telephone calls, email inquiries, and personal inquiries
concerning takings, eminent domain, and land use disputes. During that same nine-month period,
the Ombudsman's Office conducted ninety-eight formal mediations of takings or eminent
domain disputes. Eight arbitration hearings were held. The Ombudsman's Office staff is not
aware of any of that number that were appealed or otherwise litigated. In short, the
Ombudsman's Office has been very successful in achieving its purpose.17
Upon review, Box Elder County's allegations of bias against the Ombudsman's Office
are unfounded. The construction of the Ombudsman's Act itself prevents the bias against Box
u

See U.C.A. § 13-42-204(3)(c)(i), (ii) and (iii).

15

&eU.C.A, § 13-43-204(3)(d).

16

Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in Support of
Appellants, p. 12, fn 10.
11

See generally, Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
in Support ofAppellants, (Court of Appeals) pp. 15-16 and Addendum B to the same.
6

Elder County from developing and taking root at the Ombudsman's Office. The documented
successes of the Ombudsman's Office also refute any allegation of bias.
D.

The Ombudsman's Office accepted the Selmans9 request for arbitration as

required by statute.
As part of its argument, Box Elder County has asserted that the mere act of accepting the
Selmans' request for arbitration constituted bias on the part of Ombudsman's Office.18 The
origin of this argument may stem from Box Elder County's assumption that all matters resolved
through the Ombudsman's Office will result in a monetary award to the property owner.
Regardless of its origin, the argument is mistaken.
In reviewing a dispute for potential resolution under the Ombudsman's Act, the
Ombudsman's Office does not assume that the claims outlined by the property owner are true.
Rather, the statute clearly contemplates that the claims of the property owners are to be seen as
allegations.19 20 The requirements and criteria for accepting and rejecting matters submitted by
property owners are not random, but are outlined by statute.21

18

See e.g. Brief ofAppellee Box Elder Clounty, pp. 17-19.

l9

See e.g. U.C.A.§ 13-43-204(3)(b)(ii) "assuming the alleged facts are true . . . "

20

The element of ownership does not need to be proven to any decree of certainty
for the Ombudsman's Office to accept the dispute for resolution efforts. In this matter,
however, the evidence regarding the question of ownership is overwhelmingly in favor of
the Selmans. Section 31 is private property and has been held in the Selman family since
1952. Recorded deeds and abstracts of record show no grant of easement, roadway, or
other public access to Section 31. There has been no legal action adjudicating the
roadway in question to be public. See Supplemental Affidavit of Bret Selman in Support
of Motion for Preliminary Injuction ROA pp. 93 - 107.
21

U.C.A.§ 13-43-204(1) and 3(b).
7

To submit a dispute to the Ombudsman's Office, a property owner does not have to
present a prevailing or even a prima facie takings or eminent domain case. The matter needs
only "involve . . . takings or eminent domain issues." If the legislature wished to raise the bar to
require something more, such as a prima facie case of a takings claim, that language would have
been included in the statute.22 Lacking a more stringent requirement, this Court must apply and
give meaning to the criteria found within the statute. Accordingly, if a dispute "involves" takings
or eminent domain issues, then that dispute is an appropriate subject for arbitration before the
Ombudsman's Office. Regardless how one chooses to look at it, this Court cannot deny that this
matter involves takings and/or eminent domain issues. As such, the dispute passes muster and
was correctly accepted by the Ombudsman's Office. To do otherwise denies the meaning and
effect which should be given to the word "involves" as it appears in the Act.23
To hold as the court below did, that dispute resolution proceedings before the
Ombudsman's Office must be stayed until the competing interests in the property are fully
litigated would defeat the Ombudsman Office's purpose of helping parties resolve disputes
without litigation. Parties would only be able to bring takings matters to the Ombudsman's
Office after they have fully litigated their claims to the property. In other words, a party would
need to litigate before that party could take advantage of a procedure put in place to help avoid

22

See e.g. U.C.A.§ 78B-8-201 requiring showing of prima facie case before
punitive damage discovery can proceed.
23

Statutes should be construed so that "all parts thereof [are] relevant and
meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996).
Furthermore, it must be presumed "that each term included in the ordinance was used
advisedly." Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^ 30, 104 P.3d 1208, 1216.
8

litigation. The result of that interpretation of the Act is absurd and helps no one.24
The Ombudsman's Office did not exercise bias in favor of the Selmans in accepting their
request for arbitration of the dispute. Rather, the Ombudsman's Office correctly determined that
the matter involved takings issues and that proceedings with the Office were required by the Act.
E,

Litigation of the quiet title claims only will not completely resolve the parties1

dispute.
Box Elder County argues that all other issues will evaporate if the quiet title action is
resolved.25 This position, however, oversimplifies the dispute and ignores the existence of
damages which the Selmans have already suffered in this case.
As explained in earlier briefing, in April 2007, after passing a resolution26 Box Elder
County unilaterally carried out road construction activities on the trail in question. In the course
of this construction work, Box Elder County doubled, and in some cases, tripled the width of the
trail which runs through the Selmans' property. To widen the road, Box Elder County cut into
portions of the Selmans' property which the County has previously acknowledged to be private
property. In the process of widening the path, Box Elder County damaged the watershed on the

24

Statutes should be construed so that "all parts thereof [are] relevant and
meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996).
15

Brief of Appellee Box Elder County, p. 19.

26

Box Elder County alleges that certain resolutions referred to by the Selmans in
their briefing "are not part of any record." See Brief of Appellee Box Elder County, p. 16.
Box Elder County is mistaken in this regard. The resolutions were included as an exhibit
to the Complaint at the trial court which is part of the record on appeal. See ROA pp.
001-009.
9

Selman property and compromised the property's use for agricultural purposes.27
In light of these facts, the Selmans' claims for damages under the theories of takings,
inverse condemnation, or the Agricultural Protection Act28 are not prospective or speculative.
The Selmans have already suffered these damages. Regardless of what actions or decisions Box
Elder County takes in the future, the road work carried out by Box Elder County in April 2007
has already caused damages to portions of the Selmans' property which are undisputably private.
As such, these issues have to be settled regardless of the resolution of the quiet title claim. In
short, litigation of the quiet title claim is not the panacea which Box Elder County holds it up to
be.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In the end, this Court must decide whether it is truly committed to alternative dispute
resolution and the public policy considerations which support this approach to dispute resolution.
Within the Ombudsman's Act, the Utah State Legislature has granted property owners a statutory
right to arbitrate takings and eminent domain related issues with government entities. To stay
such arbitration in favor of litigation renders the language of the Act meaningless and erases any
hope of realizing the potential benefits of alternative dispute resolution.
As outlined above, Box Elder County's arguments against proceedings with the
Ombudsman's Office are based on a faulty understanding of the core purpose of the

21

See generally, Supplemental Affidavit of Bret Selman in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, f ^f 32 -33, ROA 093-107.
28

U.C.A. § 17-41-401 et. seq.
10

Ombudsman's Act and unjustified fears arising from those misunderstandings. An award
decision from an arbitration arranged by the Ombudsman's Office is more than a rubber stamp
for cash payments to private property owners. Furthermore, the Ombudsman's Office is not in
the business of "wresting" jurisdiction away from district courts. Rather, the Ombudsman's
Office is an unbiased administrative office which has been and continues to be extremely
effective at resolving takings and eminent domain issues. It was in the hopes of resolving this
dispute that the Ombudsman's Office properly accepted the Selmans' arbitration request under
the criteria outlined in the Ombudsman's Act. The misunderstandings and fears of Box Elder
County should not become an excuse to deny the Selmans and other land owners access to this
statutory dispute resolution tool.
For all of these reasons, the Selmans again request that the decision and order of the trial
court on review be reversed.
Dated this 20th day of January 2010.
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